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ARTICLES
Interpreting Sacred Texts: Preliminary
Reflections On Constitutional Discourse
In China
by
JANET E. AINSWORTH*
In the summer of 1989, people the world over were reeling from the
enormity of the Chinese government's attack on the student-led democ-
racy movement at Tiananmen Square.1 The magnitude of this catastro-
phe exceeded even the tragedy of the many individuals who were killed
and injured in the attack. What many feared, both inside and outside of
China, was that the physical assault on the democracy demonstrators
would herald an ensuing political assault on the proponents of ideologi-
cal and economic moderation and signal the end of a period in which
China aspired to full and equal participation in the community of na-
* Assistant Professor of Law, University of Puget Sound School of Law. B.A. 1975,
Brandeis University; M.A. 1977, Yale University; J.D. 1980, Harvard Law School. I would
like to thank Sid DeLong, John LaFond, Debbie Maranville, Chris Rideout, David Skover,
and Geoff Watson for their helpful comments on this piece, and research librarian Bob
Menanteaux for his invaluable assistance in tracking down source materials. I also must ex-
press my appreciation to the participants at the 1991 conference of the Law and Society Asso-
ciation in Amsterdam for their stimulating questions and comments at the presentation of an
earlier version of this essay, and to the University of Puget Sound School of Law for its gener-
ous support that made my attendance at that conference possible. Finally, I would be remiss
not to acknowledge my intellectual debt to Jerome Alan Cohen, whose contribution to my
understanding of Chinese law dwarfs whatever disagreements with him I have expressed in
this Article.
Throughout this Article, I have used the Wade-Giles system of transliteration for Chinese
names and words. Wade-Giles transliteration was universally used in English language schol-
arly work until quite recently. In the past few years, some Western scholars have chosen to
adopt the pin-yin transliteration currently used in the People's Republic of China. However,
because the vast bulk of the reference works cited use the Wade-Giles system, I have chosen to
maintain consistency by using Wade-Giles transliteration even for citations to contemporary
Chinese documents.
I. For a succinct narrative of the rise and fall of the democracy movement of 1989, see
JONATHAN SPENCE, THE SEARCH FOR MODERN CHINA 738-47 (1990). A fuller account can
be found in DAVID TuRNLEY & PETER TURNLEY, BEIJING SPRING (1989).
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tions. Would China plunge into another period of internal repression, of
turning away from the outside world?
For those of us engaged in the comparative study of Chinese law,
this larger question raised a subsidiary issue: how would changing events
in China affect the Chinese legal system, which had seen dramatic change
in the past decade? Until the events at Tiananmen Square, the 1980s
apparently promised the development of a mature Chinese socialist legal
order.2 After almost completely abandoning formal legal institutions in
the 1960s and 1970s,3 the Chinese government reversed itself, concluding
that a regularized legal infrastructure was necessary for modernization.
To promote the institutional development of a legal system, the Chinese
government launched a mass campaign4 for the inculcation of legal val-
ues and for education on the new laws being drafted.5 In support of this
mass campaign, the Chinese domestic press was replete with articles ex-
tolling the principle of the rule of law6 and lauding the accelerated pace
of enactment of statutes and codes. 7 The Chinese people were exhorted
2. A summary of the trends in the reconstruction of Chinese civil law in the 1980s can
be found in the symposium, The Emerging Framework of Chinese Civil Law, 52 LAw & CON-
TEMP. PROBS., Spring & Summer 1989, at 1-216, 1-224.
3. To borrow a term from Robert Cover, China in the Cultural Revolution period can
be said to have been institutionally jurispathic, systematically extinguishing juridical institu-
tions which were thought to be ideologically heterodox. Cf Robert M. Cover, The Supreme
Court, 1982 Term-Foreword: Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4, 53 (1983) (calling
judges jurispathic for their role in killing off alternative possibilities in legal interpretation).
Formal courts were ignored, statutes constructively repealed, law schools closed, and legal
professionals sent to the countryside to clean privies. Paul D. Reynolds, The Role of Law in
China's Modernisation, 6 POLY L. REV., Autumn 1980, at 12, 12-13. In short, at the height of
the Cultural Revolution, the formal legal system ceased to exist in any meaningful sense. For a
description of the way in which the Chinese utilized informal mechanisms of dispute resolution
during this period, see VICTOR H. Li, LAW WITHOUT LAWYERS 33-66 (1978).
4. The mass campaign, designed to mobilize popular awareness of and support for cur-
rent government priorities and goals, has been an enduring feature of political life from the
earliest days of the People's Republic of China to the present. Launched by a central govern-
ment directive defining its objectives and scope, a mass campaign is pursued by local govern-
ment, mass organizations, and the mass media. For a fuller description of this. distinctly
Chinese form of mass mobilization, see JAMES R. TowNsEND, POLITICAL PARTICIPATION IN
COMMUNIST CHINA (1967) and Lucian W. Pye, Mass Participation in Communist China: Its
Limitations and the Continuity of Culture in CHINA: MANAGEMENT OF A REVOLUTIONARY
SOCIETY 3-33 (John M. H. Lindbeck ed., 1971).
5. See, e.g., Conduct Education in the Legal System Well So As to Usher in the Enforce-
ment of the New Laws, LIAONING RIBAO, Nov. 26, 1979, microformed on U.S. Foreign Broad-
cast Information Service, Daily Report, People's Republic of China [hereinafter FBIS], No.
79-230, at S1.
6. For a representative example, see Li Buyun et al., It Is Necessary to Practice Socialist
Rule of Law, GUANGMING RIBAO, Dec. 2, 1979, at 3, microformed on FBIS No. 79-236, at
L4-L9.
7. See, e.g., Peng Zhen, The Importance of Improving China's Legislation, BEUING
REV., Aug. 27, 1984, at 16. Among the codes and statutes enacted in this period were the
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both to develop an ideological appreciation for the principle of the rule of
law and to model their behavior in accordance with formally enacted
law, rather than the vicissitudes of Party policy as enunciated by Party
cadres.8
The keystone of constructing a formal legal system was the drafting
and implementation of a new Constitution for the country in 1982. 9 The
1982 Constitution,' 0 which remains in force today, represented a dra-
Criminal Procedure Code of 1979, the Criminal Law Code of 1979, the Organic Law of the
People's Courts of 1979, the Organic Law of the People's Procuratorate of 1979, the Marriage
Law of 1980, the Provisional Regulations on Lawyers of 1980, the Economic Contract Law of
1981, the Trademark Law of 1982, the Civil Procedure Code of 1982, the Foreign Economic
Contract Law of 1983, the Patent Law of 1984, and the Inheritance Law of 1985. In all, more
than 300 new statutes were promulgated between 1979 and 1985, a dizzying pace of codifica-
tion unlike anything seen before or since in China. Jeanette L. Pinard, The People's Republic
of China: A Bibliography of Selected English-Language Materials, 3 CHINA L. REP. 46, 48
(1985).
8. See, e.g., Turn Law Over to the People, RENMIN RIAO, June 16, 1985, microformed
on FBIS No. 85-116, at K1-K3. This article, which appeared in the official People's Daily, had
a nationwide readership and is characteristic of many similar articles and broadcasts made to
the Chinese public. In it, education of the public in general, and of the political cadres in
particular, was emphasized as needed to overcome earlier "mistaken" views about the role of
law and its relationship to Party policy:
In order to translate law into a powerful material force, it is necessary to popularize
knowledge of the law among the masses of the people to enable them to have a good
grasp of the law and to cultivate the habit of doing things in accordance with the law.
At the same time, it is necessary to enable every individual department of our coun-
try to gradually change its method of handling matters from relying mainly on
[Party] policy to relying on both policy and law. Currently, some cadres do not have
adequate understanding of the importance of the legal system .... Some leading
cadres have even maintained that laws apply only to common people, not to them-
selves; and others have even substituted their words and powers for the law, placing
themselves above it .... Only when leading cadres know the law, understand the
law, and handle matters strictly according to law, can they lead the broad masses of
cadres and masses to study the law and abide by it.
Id. at K1-K2.
9. In September of 1980, the Committee for the Revision of the Constitution was estab-
lished to begin drafting a new constitution. For the next year and a half, the Committee
solicited input from a variety of official and unofficial sources. After a proposed constitution
was drafted, it was submitted to the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress for
further discussion. Following revisions at this stage, the revised draft was submitted to the
Fifth Session of the National People's Congress, which debated over a hundred amendments to
the draft, of which thirty were included in the final document. Jill Barrett, What's New in
China's New Constitution?, 9 REv. SocIALIsT L. 305, 305 (1983); Hu Sheng, On the Revision of
the Constitution, BEIJING REv., May 3, 1982, at 15. On December 4, 1982, the new constitu-
tion was ratified by the National People's Congress. Chin Kim, The Modern Chinese Legal
System, 61 TUL. L. REv. 1413, 1415 (1987).
10. For an English language text of the 1982 Constitution of the People's Republic of
China (Chung-hua jen-min kung-ho kuo hsien-fa), see 9 REv. SOCIALIST L. 183 (1983), and
BEIJING REv., Dec. 27, 1982, at 10-29. A government-sponsored edition in English was pub-
lished in 1987 by the Foreign Language Press. CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC
OF CHINA: ADOPTED AT THE FIFH SESSION OF THE FiFm NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS
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matic departure from its two immediate predecessors, the Constitutions
of 1975 and 1978.11 The 1975 Constitution in particular, influenced by
the radical Maoist insistence that a normative appeal to the concept of
legality was inherently counter-revolutionary,12 was closer to a program-
matic call to ideological arms than to what Western legal scholars would
define as a constitution.13 In contrast, the 1982 Constitution, far more
detailed and specific in its provisions,14 appeared to provide the founda-
tion for a nation governed by the rule of law rather than by Party fiat.
The question repeatedly posed by observers in the West has been
whether, and to what extent, the ambitious new Chinese constitution will
be implemented in practice. 5 Given China's relative paucity of legal re-
AND PROMULGATED FOR IMPLEMENTATION BY THE PROCLAMATION OF THE NATIONAL
PEOPLE'S CONGRESS ON DECEMBER 4, 1982 (1987).
11. English translations of the 1975 Constitution of the People's Republic of China
(Chung-huajen-min kung-ho kuo hsien-fa) can be found in SELECTED LEGAL DOCUMENTS OF
THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 65-91 (Joseph En-pao Wang ed., 1976), and in PEKING
REv., Jan. 24, 1975, at 12-17. Translations of the 1978 Constitution of the People's Republic
of China are found in 4 REv. SOCIALIST L. 247-58 (1978), and in PEKING REV., Mar. 17,
1978, at 5-14. The government-run Foreign Language Press also published English language
editions of both documents. CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA:
ADOPTED ON MARCH 5, 1978 BY THE FIFTH NATIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS OF THE PEO-
PLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AT IS FIRST SESSION (1978); CONSTITUTION OF THE PEOPLE'S
REPUBLIC OF CHINA (1975).
12. For a representative Cultural Revolution broadside blasting the notion that the rule
of law is proper in a socialist country, see Completely Smash the Feudal, Capitalist, and Revi-
sionist Legal System, in SELECTIONS FROM CHINA MAINLAND MAGAZINES, Sept. 3, 1968, at
23. The tenor of the article is completely wonsistent with its title, assailing proponents of a
formal legal system: "They talk such nonsense as 'all men are equal before the law' and con-
fine the role of the people's court to trying criminal and civil cases, convicting and punishing
the criminals and settling civil disputes." Ia
13. Jerome A. Cohen, China's Changing Constitution, 76 CHINA Q. 794, 837 (1978)
[hereinafter Cohen, China's Changing Constitution]. Professor Cohen appears to acknowledge
the ethnocentrism inherent in defining "authentic constitutions" as those patterned on the
model of Western liberal constitutions, but he nonetheless ultimately concludes that the Chi-
nese constitutions are defective for failing to satisfy Western constitutional criteria. Id. at 841.
14. The 1982 Constitution consists of 138 articles, whereas the 1975 Constitution had but
30, and the 1978 Constitution had 60. Even the 1954 Constitution had less detail, with 106
articles. Obviously, a long constitution with numerous articles does not in and of itself guaran-
tee a sensitive government committed to the rule of law. However, the shorter constitutions of
the Cultural Revolution supplied so little guidance for the institutional and legal development
of China that legal development inevitably was truncated for lack of institutional legitimiza-
tion. For example, in the 1975 Constitution the provisions defining the structure and functions
of various governmental organs were so perfunctory that it was impossible to determine what,
if anything, most governmental organs were supposed to do. See Chin Kim & Timothy G.
Kearley, The 1978 Constitution of the People's Republic of China, 2 HASTINGS INT'L & COMP.
L. REv. 251, 263-76 (1979) (detailing the changes between the 1975 and 1978 Constitutions in
their provisions defining the organs of government and noting that the 1978 Constitution pro-
vided much more specific detail in its articles defining state structure).
15. See, eg., Tony Saich, The Fourth Constitution of the People's Republic of China, 9
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sources, 16 its absence of a tradition of constitutional litigation, and its
history of ignoring written law in times of political turmoil, 17 the obsta-
cles to implementation are formidable.18 The importance of implementa-
tion to the Chinese themselves is reflected in the text of the 1982
Constitution, which provides that "all acts in violation of the constitu-
tion and the law must be examined." 19  Some Western analysts have
criticized this provision as being too vague to provide an effective mecha-
nism for implementing constitutional guarantees. 20 Such criticism as-
sumes that effectuation of constitutional provisions requires textually
explicit enforcement mechanisms within the constitution, an erroneous
assumption, as the example of the American Constitution demonstrates.
The doctrine announced in Marbury v. Madison,21 that the judiciary pos-
sessed the power to review governmental acts for constitutional validity,
is not spelled out in the text of the Constitution.22 Similarly, although
the United States Constitution's Bill of Rights lacks an express mecha-
nism for effectuating the provisions of its Fourth and Fifth Amendments,
this has not prevented American courts from fashioning exclusionary
remedies to ensure the citizens' enjoyment of these constitutional
rights. 2 3
REV. SOCIALIsT L. 113, 122 (1983); see also Jerome A. Cohen, Due Process?, in THE CHINA
DIFFERENCE 237, 242-43 (Ross Terrill ed., 1979) [hereinafter Cohen, Due Process] (asking the
same question of the 1978 constitution).
16. Despite a massive effort to train lawyers in recent years, China had, as of early 1991,
only 50,000 qualified lawyers in the entire country of over a billion people. Qualified Lawyers
to Increase to 80,000, CHINA DAILY, Jan. 16, 1991, at 3, col. 3.
17. Cohen, Due Process, supra note 15, at 239-59.
18. It is the enormity of these obstacles to implementation that allows observers to con-
tinue to speculate on the degree of future implementation of the 1982 Constitution nearly a
decade after its promulgation.
19. CHUNG-HUA JEN-MIN KUNG-HO KUO HSIEN-FA [Constitution] [hereinafter HSIEN-
FA] (1982) art. 5 (P.R.C.).
20. See, e.g., Saich, supra note 15, at 122.
21. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
22. As many constitutional scholars have pointed out, judicial review as mandated by
Marbury v. Madison was not inevitable given the text of the Constitution. See LAURENCE H.
TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 23-42 (2d ed. 1988) (discussing Marbury and its
progeny, including citations to sources maintaining that the doctrine was not inherent in the
Constitution).
23. Insofar as the texts of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments are silent as to the remedy
to be applied for their violation, some commentators have argued that the exclusionary rule is
both constitutionally unnecessary and socially unwise. See, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Excessive
Sanctions for Governmental Misconduct in Criminal Cases, 57 WASH. L. REv. 635 (1982).
Other scholars have rushed to the rule's constitutional defense. See, e.g., Yale Kamisar, The
Exclusionary Rule in Historical Perspective: The Struggle to Make the Fourth Amendment
More than an "Empty Blessing," 62 JUDICATURE 337 (1979); Yale Kamisar, Does (Did)
(Should) the Exclusionary Rule Rest on a "Principled Basis" Rather than an "Empirical Propo-
sition," 16 CREIGHTON L. REV. 565 (1983); Thomas S. Schrock & Robert C. Welsh, Up from
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Only time will tell if the Chinese will develop their own institutional
mechanisms for the implementation of their constitution. The question
that I would like to pose, however, is not whether China will judicially
implement its constitution, but rather how that constitution might be
used in Chinese political discourse.
Most Western commentators have looked at the successive constitu-
tions of the People's Republic of China in one of two ways. On the one
hand, some analysts hav dismissed these documents as meaningless
shams-propaganda intended to fool the native population or gullible
outsiders by disguising the arbitrary and oppressive character of the gov-
ernment.24 Commentators adopting this perspective assume that Chi-
nese constitutional language ought to be interpreted precisely in accord
with Western constitutional practice. The Chinese constitution is then
judged according to how well that constitution effectuates the values em-
bodied in Western constitutional thought which correspond to the terms
used in the Chinese constitutions. Not surprisingly, measured by that
yardstick, the Chinese constitutions appear woefully deficient. 25
This perspective presupposes that using Western terminology and
categories to represent and evaluate the legal system of a non-Western
culture is unproblematic. 26 It ignores the fundamental difficulty that
Calandra: The Exclusionary Rule as a Constitutional Requirement, 59 MINN. L. REv. 251
(1975). Regardless of whether the exclusionary rule is thought to be constitutionally required,
it is clear that, like Marbury's judicial review, the exclusionary rule can only be supported by
appeal to implicit institutional needs, not explicit textual provisions.
24. See, e.g., Cohen, China's Changing Constitution, supra note 13, at 836-41. Certain
Western scholars display this attitude of dismissive skepticism in addressing the constitutions
of other socialist countries as well as China. See, e.g., Georg Brunner, The Functions of Com-
munist Constitutions: An Analysis of Recent Constitutional Developments, 3 REv. SOCIALIST L.
121, 146-47 (1977); John N. Hazard, A Soviet Model for Marxian Socialist Constitutions, 60
CORNELL L. REv. 985, 986 (1975); Lowell Dittmer, The Succession Drama in China, 26
PROBS. COMMUNISM, Jan.-Feb. 1977, at 57 (book review). Christopher Osakwe has observed
that many Western academicians maintain a nihilistic stance with respect to socialist legal
systems, apparently believing "that socialist law is an oxymoron." Christopher Osakwe, Intro-
duction: The Greening of Socialist Law as an Academic Discipline, 61 TUL. L. REv. 1257,
1258-62 (1987).
25. Cohen, China's Changing Constitution, supra note 13, at 840-41.
26. Legal anthropologists have long grappled with the problem of choosing appropriate
vocabulary for the description of non-Western legal systems, an issue referred to as the Bohan-
nan-Gluckman controversy. Paul Bohannan insisted on using native terms for legal concepts
because he believed that Western terminology was inevitably misleading in its connotations.
Max Gluckman, on the other hand, thought that universal legal terminology, which might or
might not correspond to Western legal terminology, did exist and could adequately describe
non-Western legal systems. See Paul Bohannan, Ethnography and Comparison in Legal An-
thropology, in LAW IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY 401-18 (Laura Nader ed., 1969); Max
Gluckman, Concepts in the Comparative Study of Tribal Law, in LAW IN CULTURE AND SOCI-
ETY, supra, at 349-73; Laura Nader, Introduction to LAW IN CULTURE AND SOCIETY, supra,
at 4-6.
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translation cannot provide exactly equivalent terms-that connotations
are invariably added and lost in translation,27 particularly when the lan-
guages involved are as radically different as Chinese is from the Indo-
European languages of the West.28 Slippage in meaning29 occurs even
27. As Walter Benjamin phrased it, "(A)ll translation is only a somewhat provisional
way of coming to terms with the foreignness of languages." Walter Benjamin, The Task of the
Translator, in ILLUMINATIONS 69, 75 (1969). Jacques Derrida, reflecting upon the difficulty of
selecting a Japanese word to translate his term "deconstruction," observed that the issue of
translation is inextricably linked to the fact that the meaning of any concept is inseparable
from its cultural context:
[Tihe difficulty of defining and therefore also of translating the word "deconstruc-
tion" stems from the fact that all the predicates, all the defining concepts, all the
lexical significations, and even the syntactic articulations, which seem at one moment
to lend themselves to this definition or to that translation, are also deconstructed or
deconstructible, directly or otherwise, etc.. . The word "deconstruction," like all
other words, acquires its value only from its inscription in a chain of possible substi-
tutions, in what is too blithely called a "context."
Jacques Derrida, Letter to a Japanese Friend, in A DERRIDA READER: BETWEEN THE
BLINDS 270, 274-75 (Peggy Kamufed., 1991). On the issue of cross-cultural translation gener-
ally, see Talal Asad, The Concept of Cultural Translation in British Social Anthropology, in
WRITING CULTURE: THE POETICS AND PoLITICS OF ETHNOGRAPHY 141-64 (James Clifford
& George E. Marcus eds., 1986). Problems in translation can be seen as a subset of the more
general problem of how foreign cultures can be represented in Western scholarly discourse.
See CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Found in Translation: On the Social History of the Moral Imagina-
tion, in LOCAL KNOWLEDGE 36, 36-54 (1983); CLIFFORD GEERTZ, "From the Native's Point
of View"." On the Nature of Anthropological Understanding, in LOCAL KNOWLEDGE, supra, at
55, 55-70; GEORGE E. MARCUS & MICHAEL M. J. FISCHER, ANTHROPOLOGY AS CULTURAL
CRITIQUE 45-76 (1986).
28. Scholars of Chinese history and literature have similarly been confronted with the
problem of cross-cultural translation. For a sensitive discussion of the issue, including aspects
which are unique to the Chinese language, see Achilles Fang, Some Reflections on the Diffl-
culty of Translation, in STUDIES IN CHINESE THOUGHT 263-85 (Arthur F. Wright ed., 1953);
I. A. Richards, Toward a Theory of Translating, in STUDIES IN CHINESE THOUGHT, supra, at
247-62; Arthur F. Wright, The Chinese Language and Foreign Ideas, in STUDIES IN CHINESE
THOUGHT, supra, at 286-303. See also PAUL A. COHEN, DISCOVERING HISTORY IN CHINA:
AMERICAN HISTORICAL WRITING ON THE RECENT CHINESE PAST 14 (1984) [hereinafter
COHEN, DISCOVERING HISTORY] (giving the example of translating the English words "free-
dom" or "liberty" with the Chinese word tzu-yu, the etymology of which gives the Chinese
term connotations of anarchistic, selfish license which are absent in the English words it pur-
portedly reproduces in translation); JOHN E. SCHRECKER, THE CHINESE REVOLUTION IN
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 200-01 n.9 (1991) (noting that Western languages lack an adequate
vocabulary to translate the Chinese terminology describing features of the social and political
structure of high imperial China).
29. I should point out that linguistic incommensurability between two languages is a
product, not only of slippage in translation, but also more generally of the fact that the mean-
ing of a concept is constructed within cultures which may have radically differing contexts in
which the concept is understood. For a striking example of this problem, see JOHN LYONS,
LANGUAGE AND LINGUISTICS 325-27 (1981) (using the example of the Greek word "sophia,"
usually translated into English as "wisdom," to demonstrate that such a translation either
forces the translator to use the English word "wisdom" in contexts that render the translation
absurd or requires the translator to choose more than one English word to express "sophia,"
thereby obscuring the consistency of the original discourse). See generally the essays collected
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when the choice of foreign terminology is made by actors within the na-
tive legal culture, since they are likely to be unaware of the precise con-
notations of the adopted vocabulary within the Western social and
historical contexts.30 Moreover, even aside from the considerable
problems inherent in translation, the very categories and concepts with
which the scholar organizes her description and analysis of a legal system
are freighted with culturally contingent normative baggage. 31 Scholar-
ship that ignores these problems suffers precisely because the scholar is
not conscious of the Western cultural assumptions intrinsic to the
analysis.
Other Western commentators analyze the Chinese constitutions in
an alternative, less implicitly ethnocentric way. These scholars meticu-
lously pore over each provision of the documents, comparing new consti-
tutional texts with their antecedents to ferret out evidence of political and
ideological trends in China. 32 It is not surprising that China's constitu-
tions are subjected to this kind of microscopic, word-by-word examina-
tion. Since the founding of the People's Republic of China, the Chinese
in CULTURAL MODELS IN LANGUAGE AND THOUGHT (Dorothy Holland & Naomi Quinn
eds., 1987) (anthropologists, linguists, and psychologists addressing culturally constructed as-
pects of language and thought); Roy G. D'Andrade, Cultural Meaning Systems, in CULTURE
THEORY: ESSAYS ON MIND, SELF, AND EMOTION 88, 88-119 (Richard A. Shweder & Robert
A. LeVine eds., 1984) (discussing the replication of conceptual structures through culturally
contextual systems of meaning).
30. Paul Cohen gives one example from the late nineteenth century, when Chinese schol-
ars translated the Western word "sociology" as ch'zin-hsiieh, incorporating into their transla-
tion their misperception that Western sociology centered upon the need to inculcate a sense of
community within the body politic. COHEN, DISCOVERING HISTORY supra note 28, at 200
n.8. For a more recent example, see Xiaomei Chen, "Misunderstanding" Western Modernism:
The Menglong Movement in Post-Mao China, 35 REPRESENTATIONS 143, 146-48, 156-59
(Summer 1991) (noting that contemporary Chinese poetry has been influenced by an erroneous
interpretation of Western modernism shared both by these poets and their critics). See also the
essays cited supra note 28.
31. For a persuasive demonstration of the way in which normative content permeates
even legal scholarship that ostensibly is purely descriptive in its scope, see Pierre Schlag,
Normativity and the Politics of Form, 139 U. PA. L. Rv. 801, 811-14 (1991), noting that "the
context and the legal unconscious ... perform normative work in selecting, establishing, and
organizing the so-called 'descriptive' categories deployed in legal thought." Id. at 812.
32. For an example of this type of analysis, see Tony Saich's article which adopts the
metaphor of the constitution as a "barometer for China's political, economic, and social cli-
mate," and later compares it to a " 'snapshot' of the current leaderships' view of their system
and the way they feel it should operate." Saich, supra note 15, at 113, 122. For other such
analyses, see, e.g., Barrett, supra note 9, at 309-39; Ph. de Heer, The 1978 Constitution of the
People's Republic of China, 4 REv. SOCIALIST L. 309 (1978); R. Randle Edwards, Civil and
Social Rights: Theory and Practice in Chinese Law Today, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEMPO-
RARY CHINA 41, 52-74 (R. Randle Edwards et al. eds., 1986); Kim, supra note 9, at 1415-18;
Andrew 3. Nathan, Political Rights in Chinese Constitutions, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEM-
PORARY CHINA, supra, at 77, 102-20 [hereinafter Nathan, Political Rights].
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political process has been largely, and at times entirely, closed to Western
observers. As a result, Western scholars have eagerly seized any infor-
mation to which they have had access, including officially released docu-
ments such as constitutions. True, a close parsing of such documents
may help shed light on the evolving political situation in China. One
must keep in mind, however, that a finished document often represents a
negotiated consensus that may obscure conflicts between various political
factions. Even if such a perspective is useful to political scientists assess-
ing current political trends in China, it fails to address the role of the
constitutional text within the context of Chinese political discourse.
Both of these ways of looking at Chinese constitutions share the pre-
sumption that the text itself is a transparent container for its subject mat-
ter. Yet the subject matter of a text is only one aspect of its meaning.
What a text says may be less important than what it is. In this Article, I
will consider how the nature of the text, in this case a constitution, con-
tributes to the meaning of the text.
Interpretation of any text involves the reader in a series of interpre-
tive choices. 33 Because interpretive practices are culturally situated,
34
textual interpretive choices must be made from the set of contingent in-
terpretive strategies that the culture provides to the reader. Therefore,
Chinese constitutional interpretation necessarily will be governed by Chi-
nese textual interpretive strategies and assumptions. Moreover, a consti-
tution is a specific type of written text-it is a political text which is both
foundational and generative of subsequent juridical discourse. Such
texts, I will suggest, tend to be interpreted using the specific interpretive
strategies with which a culture interprets its archetypal foundational
texts, that is, its sacred texts.
Many American scholars have drawn parallels between the place of
scripture in our religious tradition and the role of the U.S. Constitution
33. The nature of interpretation has been a central preoccupation of modem literary criti-
cism as well as of legal theory. For a representative collection of essays on interpretation, see
THE PoLITICS OF INTERPRETATION (W.J.T. Mitchell ed., 1983). Stanley Fish has written
extensively in both legal and literary journals of the ways in which interpretation is constrained
by locally situated practice. See STANLEY FISH, Is THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? THE
AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES 1-17, 338-55 (1980) (asserting that interpretive
communities produce meaning through shared values, assumptions, and ideology). For a dis-
cussion of the applicability of literary theory to the problem of legal interpretation, see Ken-
neth S. Abraham, Statutory Interpretation and Literary Theory: Some Common Concerns of an
Unlikely Pair, in INTERPRETING LAW AND LITERATURE 115-29 (Sanford Levinson & Steven
Mailloux eds., 1988).
34. Contemporary anthropology has explored the cultural contingency of the construc-
tion of meaning. See, eg., GEERTZ, LOCAL KNOWLEDGE, supra note 27, and the essays col-
lected in WRITING CULTURE: THE POETICS AND POLITICS OF ETHNOGRAPHY, supra note 27.
See also the essays cited supra note 29.
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in the American political culture.35 The reverence for the American con-
stitutional system which makes criticism of it tantamount to heresy, the
faith that the "founding fathers" were divinely inspired in their drafting
of the Constitution,36 and the veneration of the text itselP 7 are three
hallmarks of what has been called America's "civil religion."'38 The Con-
stitution can be seen as the foundational text of that civil religion.
39
When American judges and lawyers were first faced with the prob-
lem of how their new Constitution should be interpreted, they already
had a set of interpretive strategies derived from the Anglo-American
Christian hermeneutical tradition.40 Professor Sanford Levinson has
identified what he calls "Protestant" and "Catholic" positions on both
the question of the significance of the constitutional text for doctrinal
35. American constitutional scholars have found the Biblical analogy a fruitful one in a
variety of contexts. See, eg., Robert A. Burt, Constitutional Law and the Teaching of the
Parables, 93 YALE L.J. 455 (1984); Cover, supra note 3, at 1; Thomas C. Grey, The Constitu-
tion as Scripture, 37 STAN. L. REV. 1 (1984) (acknowledging the prevalence of theologically
based methods of textual exegesis in constitutional interpretation, but insisting that this is not
a desirable interpretive strategy); Sanford Levinson, "The Constitution" in American Civil Reli-
gion, 1979 Sup. CT. REV. 123.
36. See MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD Go OF ITSELF: THE CONSTI-
TUTION IN AMERICAN CULTURE 225 n.17 (1986) (citing examples of prominent American
commentators making this claim).
37. For an early observation on the quasi-religious mythology surrounding the Constitu-
tion, see Max Lemer, Constitution and Court as Symbols, 46 YALE L.J. 1290 (1937). Professor
W. Tarver Rountree explains the veneration of the Constitution in sociological terms, asserting
that since the Constitution "symbolizes what we think we are as a society, ... it is worth
celebrating. In worshipping the Constitution we collectively reinforce and extend its values."
W. Tarver Rountree, Jr., Constitutionalism as the American Religion: The Good Portion, 39
EMORY L.J. 203, 205 (1990).
38. See the essays collected in AMERICAN CIVIL RELIGION (Russell E. Richey & Donald
G. Jones eds., 1974); ROBERT N. BELLAH, THE BROKEN COVENANT: AMERICAN CIVIL
RELIGION IN A TIME OF TRIAL (1975).
39. Levinson, supra note 35, at 125; see also KAMMEN, supra note 36, at 22-23, 36-37,
224-26 (documenting the cult of constitution worship throughout American history); Roun-
tree, supra note 37, at 203-07 (arguing that American constitutionalism satisfies sociologists'
definition of religion).
40. In a detailed historical examination of the origins of constitutional interpretation,
Professor H. Jefferson Powell noted the influence of Anglo-American scriptural hermeneutics
on the earliest attempts at constitutional interpretation. H. Jefferson Powell, The Original
Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARv. L. REV. 885, 889-94 (1985). I argue that the
hermeneutic model of interpretation derived from the Judeo-Christian scriptural exegesis has
exercised, and continues to exercise, a powerful if often unacknowledged influence on the prac-
tice of American constitutional interpretation. However, I do not mean to suggest that the
hermeneutical model is the sole interpretive modality for American constitutional interpreta-
tion. Plainly there are a number of other interpretive assumptions-literal textualism, framer's
intent, etc.-which have informed our practice of constitutional interpretation in the past as
well as in the present. For a representative sampling of these positions, see the essays collected
in JOHN H. GARVEY & T. ALEXANDER ALEINIKOFF, MODERN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY:
A READER (1989).
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generation and the question of authority to interpret that text.41 Eight-
eenth century Protestants, particularly those who were followers of Mar-
tin Luther, believed that the scriptural text embodied the sole source of
Christian doctrine.42 Similarly, one interpretive strategy adopted for
American constitutional exegesis is the stance that constitutional law can
look only to the precise text of the document for constitutional doc-
trine.43 In contrast, the dominant view on scripture held by eighteenth
century Catholics was that unwritten church tradition was the equal of
scripture as a source of valid theological doctrine. 44 The parallel position
in constitutional theory maintains that unwritten social and political val-
ues embedded in American culture are as legitimate a source of constitu-
tional law as the wording of the text itself.45
Just as American constitutional theorists have adopted recognizably
"Protestant" and "Catholic" interpretive positions on the authority of
the text, they have also developed "Protestant" and "Catholic" positions
on the question of who can be an authoritative interpreter of the founda-
tional text.46 A central tenet of Protestantism is its attack on the author-
ity of the organized church, which Protestant theology denies has any
superior claim to correct scriptural interpretation.47 The Catholic
Church, on the other hand, consistently asserts its authority to establish
a privileged interpretation of the Bible.48 The corresponding positions on
constitutional law are the so-called "Protestant" view that constitutional
analysis can be considered "correct" solely on the objective calibre of the
logic and insight of the person doing the analysis, 49 as opposed to the
"Catholic" notion that judges, particularly those of the highest court,
are, by virtue of their office, the sole interpreters whose constitutional
exegesis can be considered valid.5 0
In describing these interpretive strategies as "Protestant" and
"Catholic," 5 I do not mean to suggest that constitutional scholars are
41. Professor Levinson set forth this typology in his influential essay, Levinson, supra
note 35. A revised and expanded version of this discussion can be found in SANFORD LEVIN-
SON, CONSTrIUTIONAL FArrH 9-53 (1988). Professor Levinson's analogy between scriptural
exegesis and constitutional analysis was adopted and elaborated upon in Grey, supra note 35.
42. Levinson, supra note 35, at 125-27.
43. Id. at 132-33, 133-35.
44. Id. at 125-27.
45. Id. at 132-33, 135-36.
46. Id. at 137-41.
47. Id. at 127-30.
48. Id. at 127-28.
49. Id. at 138-41.
50. Id. at 137-38.
51. It should be noted that these descriptions of Protestant and Catholic exegetical mod-
els are of necessity schematic in nature. By eliminating details of the development of these
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influenced in their legal analysis by the religious beliefs which they hold
or with which they were raised as children.52 Nor do I claim that an
individual's view on issues of institutional authority is necessarily consis-
tent with that person's position on the question of textual authority. In
fact, it is common for a particular individual to adopt a "Protestant"
position of textual authority but a "Catholic" posture on institutional
authority, or, less commonly, the other way around.5 3 Positions on con-
stitutional interpretation bear no necessary relationship to the actual reli-
gious beliefs of the interpreter. Rather, these religiously grounded
interpretive strategies are part of the ordinarily unnoticed cultural frame-
work in which constitutional exegesis is embedded. As such, the inter-
preter does not need to be conscious of the theological origin of the
interpretive strategy chosen for constitutional analysis, nor of the fact
that her constitutional interpretation is predicated upon culturally spe-
cific interpretive assumptions.54 In effect, interpretive assumptions and
strategies form part of the inventory of cultural resources available for
members of the interpretive community to draw upon in the construction
of meaning.
China, too, has a tradition of textual exegesis applied to its own ca-
non of generative, foundational texts, the Confucian Classics. Without
getting mired in the hoary debate on whether Confucianism"5 is a reli-
gious or a humanist tradition,56 one can surely agree that the Confucian
theological positions, the richness and subtle diversity of thought within each religious tradi-
tion are understated. Nonetheless, I believe that the outline of these contrasting stances is a
valid characterization of each tradition.
52. Professor Levinson considers this possibility with respect to Justice Hugo Black, but
ultimately concludes that it would be premature to attempt to correlate constitutional stances
with personal religious beliefs. Levinson, supra note 35, at 133 & n.41.
53. Id at 132-33.
54. Stanley Fish, Dennis Martinez and the Uses of Theory, 96 YALE L.J. 1773, 1794-98
(1987) (arguing that interpretive constructs are not, and can not, be consciously chosen); cf
Steven L. Winter, Bull Durham and the Uses of Theory, 42 STAN. L. REv. 639, 681-91 (1990)
(refuting Fish's claim by asserting that situated self-consciousness makes it possible to choose
among competing interpretive constructs).
55. Professor John Schrecker has described Confucianism as
a sociohistorical analysis combined with an ethical system .... [I]t is a normative
sociology that... deals with all aspects of human life, from personal psychology to
the political system, from religion to the family .... The goal of Confucianism is to
develop an effective, peaceful, and ethical society, with a decent life for the people.
SCHRECKER, supra note 28, at 10-11. For a concise yet finely nuanced description of the Con-
fucian persuasion, see id. at 10-20.
56. Asking whether Confucianism is a religion is not a particularly meaningful question,
because the answer to the question is determined by the definition of the term "religion." If
one defines religion as a theistic belief system concerned with the origin and destiny of human-
ity, then Confucianism does not appear to be a religion. If, however, the definition embraces
an ethical system which marginalizes supernatural elements and is grounded in empirically
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canon was comparable in significance and centrality to the importance of
Judeo-Christian scripture in the West.57 The interpretive strategies de-
veloped in the course of the unfolding of the Confucian tradition, how-
ever, entail very different assumptions from those inherent in the Judeo-
Christian hermeneutic tradition. Confucianism has its own distinctive
answers to the questions of how the sacred canon is constituted and how
the texts convey meaning. An examination of the historical development
of these interpretive assumptions will illustrate certain interpretive strate-
gies that are embedded within Chinese culture, which in turn will suggest
a way in which an autochthonous Chinese constitutionalism might de-
velop in the future.
The Confucian Classics are a collection of writings said to date from
the late Chou Dynasty (1122 - 221 B.C.).58 In accord with the Chinese
cultural penchant for enumeration, they are referred to as either the Five
Classics or the Six Classics. 59 The Five Classics are but a small sample of
established reason, then Confucianism is indeed a religious tradition. Such a battle of defini-
tions by its very nature can have no decisive winner. For a representative presentation of each
side of this debate, however, compare C. K. YANG, RELIGION IN CHINESE SOCIETY: A STUDY
OF CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL FUNCTIONS OF RELIGION AND SOME OF THEIR HISTORICAL
FACTORS 244-77 (1961) (arguing that Confucianism is a religious belief system) with FUNG
YU-LAN, A SHORT HIsTORY OF CHINESE PHILOSOPHY 1-10 (1948) (contending that it is a
secular, humanistic philosophy). For a discussion which goes beyond the rehashing of old
arguments, see Young-chan Ro, The Significance of the Confucian Texts as "Scripture" in the
Confucian Tradition, 15 J. CHINESE PHIL. 269 (1988). Ro declines to characterize Confucian-
ism as either a religious or a humanist tradition, calling it an ambiguous "boundary situation"
which challenges our definition of both religion and scripture. Id at 269-72.
57. See Ro, supra note 56, at 270. Although Ro is ambivalent about classifying the Con-
fucian Classics as a form of scripture, he does not doubt that the Classics occupied a position
in the Confucian order comparable to that assumed by scripture in the premodern West. See
also JOHN B. HENDERSON, SCRIPTURE, CANON, AND COMMENTARY: A COMPARISON OF
CONFUCIAN AND WESTERN EXEGESIS (1991) (comparing texts and methods of textual exege-
sis used in interpreting the Confucian Classics, the Christian Bible, the Judaic Torah, the Is-
lamic Koran, the Indic Vedas, and the Mediterranean Homeric epics); Daniel K. Gardner,
Modes of Thinking and Modes of Discourse in the Sung: Some Thoughts on the Yzl-lu ("Re-
corded Conversations") Texts, 50 J. ASIAN STUD. 574, 577-79 (1991) (classifying the Confucian
Classics as a body of sacred texts).
58. The latter part of the Chou Dynasty was a feudal period in which many warring
states vied for dominance over China. During this era, the so-called Hundred Schools of Chi-
nese philosophy competed for influence, seeking the patronage of the warring principalities.
Although at the time, Confucius and his followers were merely one among a number of rival
political philosophers, by the time of the Han Dynasty, Confucianism had become the sanc-
tioned state orthodoxy. Ro, supra note 56, at 279-82.
59. The Five Classics are the Book of Changes (I ching), the Book of Poetry (Shih ching),
the Book of Documents (Shu ching), the Book of Rites (Li cht), and the Spring and Autumn
Annals (Ch'uzn chiu). A sixth classic, the Book of Music (Ytieh ching) was lost in antiquity.
During the Sung Dynasty (960 - 1279 A.D.), some scholars re-invigorated the numbering of
the original Six Classics by adding a new sixth volume to the canon, the Rites of Chou (Chou
h1). WING-TSIT CHAN, A SOURCE BOOK IN CHINESE PHILOSOPHY 17, 728 (1963).
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the voluminous writings generated during this golden age of philosophi-
cal ferment, when many competing schools of political philosophy were
actively promoting their prescriptions for a better world. After the col-
lapse of the Chou Dynasty, the succeeding Ch'in emperor, Shih Huang-
ti, was said to have ordered the burning of the Classics in a literary inqui-
sition in 213 B.C. in order to suppress sources of subversive ideology
which might have undermined Ch'in legitimacy. 6°
When the ensuing Han Dynasty (206 B.C. - 221 A.D) assumed
power a few years after the death of Shih Huang-ti, scholars attempted to
reconstruct the Classics from memory, writing them in the then current
style of script. Some years later, certain scholars claimed to have discov-
ered surviving copies of the Classics which had ostensibly escaped the
Ch'in burning decree-texts written using the ancient style characters of
the Chou Dynasty. For a brief time, the two rival sets of texts, the "New
Texts" (chin wen) in contemporary Han Dynasty script and the "Old
Texts" (ku wen) in ancient script, vied for dominance among Confucian
scholars. By the closing years of the Han Dynasty, however, the Old
Text versions of the Classics prevailed over the New Texts. Neverthe-
less, the episode of the book-burning shaped the Confucian attitude to-
wards the Classics, fueling a perpetual insecurity that the canon which
survived was in some way defective or incomplete. That fear was to pro-
vide the justification for revising and reconstructing the canon through-
out Chinese history.61
As a result, one of the most striking characteristics of the Confucian
canon is its openness, its resistance to closure.62 Classical scholars over
the centuries felt free to propose additions or deletions to the Confucian
canon.63 The Book of Rites, for example, was originally supposed to
have contained 204 chapters. Later scholars whittled it down to eighty-
five, then to forty-nine chapters. 64 Confucius himself provided a prece-
dent for such wholesale revision of the classical texts, in that he tradition-
ally was credited with excising major portions of the Book of Poetry, and
perhaps the Book of Documents as well.
65
60. See Ro, supra note 56, at 275-77.
61. HENDERSON, supra note 57, at 40.
62. John Henderson has noted that the Confucian canon is singular among world tradi-
tions in its resistance to final fixation of both the identity of the constituent texts of the canon
and of the wording within the canonical texts themselves. Id. at 49, 53. In contrast, he ob-
served that "in the Christian tradition, heretics were often recognized by their refusal to recog-
nize the closure of the Canon, as was the case of the Gnostics of late antiquity." Id at 56.
63. Id. at 53-56, 153-54; Gardner, supra note 57, at 581 & n.10.
64. HENDERSON, supra note 57, at 29.
65. Id. at 27-30.
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Undoubtedly, the most consequential instance of an addition to the
canon was that made by twelfth century Neo-Confucian Chu Hsi.6 6 Chu
Hsi collected together the Analects of Confucius (Lun-yfi), the Book of
Mencius (Meng-tzu), the Doctrine of the Mean (Chung-yung), and the
Great Learning (Ta hst'eh), calling them the Four Books. From 1313 to
1905, the Four Books eclipsed even the Five Classics in importance in
the imperial examination system.67 Until Chu Hsi and his followers can-
onized them,6 8 neither the Analects nor the Book of Mencius had at-
tained classical status, and the other two works had never even been
recognized as independent texts in their own right.6 9
Although Chu Hsi's canonization of the Four Books was his most
spectacularly influential addition to the canon,70 it was not his only con-
66. Chu Hsi, also known as Chu Yilan-hui, was born in 1130 and died in 1200. CHAN,
supra note 59, at 588.
67. Id at 18 & n. 11. The imperial examination system provided the predominant means
of staffing the government bureaucracy for much of Chinese history. Beginning in the T'ang
Dynasty (618 - 907 A.D.), those wishing to enter government service had to pass a series of
examinations in which the candidates needed to demonstrate sophisticated mastery of the Con-
fucian canon. The examination questions required the candidate to identify fragments of class-
ical text, and compose a dissertation on the text using a highly stylized analytic format called
the "eight legged" essay (pa-ku wen-chang). Mastering the canon and the required "eight
legged" manner of writing required years of intensive study. In some cases, this study could
stretch into decades--some candidates sat for the preliminary exams as many as sixteen times
over a lifetime. JOHN R. WATr, THE DISTRICT MAGISTRATE IN LATE IMPERIAL CHINA 24
(1972). For a fuller description of the examination system and its functioning in late imperial
China, see CHANG CHUNG-LI, THE CHINESE GENTRY 35-43, 165-209 (1955); JOANNA F.
HANDLN, ACTION IN LATE MING THOUGHT 16-20 (1983); WATT, supra, at 23-25.
Upon passing the exams, the degree holder became a member of the scholar-gentry class,
the acknowledged elite in Chinese society. Imperial China lacked any significant competing
bases of social status and power. Neither military nor commercial achievement carried even
remotely equivalent prestige, nor was there a powerful religious infrastructure for most of
Chinese history. Only through success in the examination system could one achieve recog-
nized status in the social hierarchy. See CHANG, supra, at 32-35; JOHN W. DARDESS, CON-
FUCIANISM AND AUTOCRACY: PROFESSIONAL ELITES IN THE FOUNDING OF THE MING
DYNASTY (1983); Ho P'ING-TI, THE LADDER OF SUCCESS IN IMPERIAL CHINA 1-91 (1962).
Because the social elite and the governmental bureaucracy were by necessity steeped in the
Confucian canon, this shared discourse constituted the political and ideological grammar of
imperial China.
68. The content of the Confucian canon was established by an imperially commissioned
body of scholars who gave their official imprimatur to the corpus of Confucian texts which
served as the basis for the Confucian examination system. HENDERSON, supra note 57, at 38-
39.
69. Both the Doctrine of the Mean (Chung-yung) and the Great Learning (Ta hstieh)
originated as chapters of the Book of Rites (Li ch). CHAN, supra note 59, at 589.
70. Despite the fact that the Chu Hsi canonization of the Four Books, together with his
classical commentaries, became the orthodox Confucian course of study to be used in the
examinations, the ascendancy of the Chu Hsi version of the canon was by no means uncon-
tested, even among scholars who otherwise adhered to Neo-Confucian doctrine. For example,
the imperially commissioned Essence of Moral Truth (Hsing-li ch'ing-i), compiled in 1715
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tribution to reshaping the Confucian Classics. Chu Hsi felt free to rear-
range the order of portions of the classical texts. He filled in what he
regarded as textual lacunae, and excised individual characters and even
whole passages which he thought were spurious or merely redundant.71
Such wholesale canonical revision could only have been tolerated within
a tradition in which the openness of its canon was unproblematical. 72
The contestability of the classical Confucian texts was to have dra-
matic political consequences in late imperial China. During the late
Ming Dynasty (1368 - 1644), a handful of scholars began to contest the
authenticity of certain Neo-Confucian texts. 73 By the seventeenth cen-
tury, many Confucian scholars followed this lead in questioning ortho-
dox reliance on the Old Text versions of the Classics, which supposedly
had been uncovered centuries after the infamous burning of the books.
Using sophisticated philological techniques, these scholars exposed a
number of these classical texts as forgeries.74 They therefore advocated
during the reign of the K'ang-hsi Emperor of the Ch'ing Dynasty, constituted the officially
sanctioned compendium of Neo-Confucianism. Despite its deference to Chu Hsi's classical
commentaries, however, the Hsing-li ch'ing-i rejected Chu Hsi's rearrangement of the text of
the Great Learning and the Doctrine of the Mean. Wing-tsit Chan, The Hsing-li ch'ing-i and
the Ch'eng-Chu School of the Seventeenth Century, in THE UNFOLDING OF NEO-CONFUCIAN-
ISM 543, 557 (William T. De Bary ed., 1975); see also KWANG-CHING LIU, ORTHODOXY IN
LATE IMPERIAL CHINA 15-16 (1990) (noting that the Hsing-li ch'ing-i compendium demon-
strated the extent to which the state equivocated in accepting Chu Hsi's views on Confucian
doctrine).
71. HENDERSON, supra note 57, at 153.
72. Professor Daniel Gardner notes that Neo-Confucian epistemology contributed to
what he calls their "freer attitude" towards the Confucian canon. Gardner, supra note 57, at
596. Because Neo-Confucian philosophy was committed to the epistemological position that
the human mind has the inherent capacity for recognizing and comprehending truth, it fol-
lowed not only that the ancient sages had no a priori privileged monopoly on philosophical
correctness, but also that Neo-Confucian contemporary scholars could themselves add to the
Confucian canon of sacred texts. Id at 580-83.
73. Chiao Hung (1540? - 1620) was an early critic of Neo-Confucian textual exegesis,
exploiting the contestability of the text in his own scholarship. For instance, Chiao Hung
altered the reading of three characters in one text, changing its meaning completely. Edward
T. Ch'ien, Chiao Hung and the Revolt Against Ch'eng-Chu Orthodoxy, in THE UNFOLDING OF
NEO-CONFUCIANISM, supra note 70, at 271, 285-86. For a further discussion of Chiao Hung
and his recognition of the problematic nature of the canonical texts, see EDWARD T. CH'IEN,
CHIAO HUNG AND THE RESTRUCTURING OF NEo-CONFUCIANISM IN THE LATE MING 178-
94 (1986). Edward Ch'ien sees Chiao Hung as a forerunner of the later k'ao-cheng school of
textual criticism. Id. at 30.
74. This group of scholars, referred to as the empirical research (k'ao-cheng) school, used
techniques of philology, phonetics, and etymology to test the authenticity of the canonical
texts. Yen Jo-chii (1636 - 1704) used the k'ao-cheng methodology to prove that the accepted
Old Text of the Book of Documents was a post-Han forgery. From that point on, all of the
canon was subjected to searching philological examination. BENJAMIN A. ELMAN, CLASSI-
CISM, POLITICS, AND KINSHIP: THE CH'ANG-CHOU SCHOOL OF NEW TEXT CONFUCIANISM
IN LATE IMPERIAL CHINA 103-16 (1990) [hereinafter ELMAN, CLASSICISM, POLITICS, AND
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going back to the so-called New Text versions of the Classics, which Han
Dynasty scholars had reconstructed from memory. They rejected not
only the Old Texts themselves but the influential Chu Hsi commentaries
on the discredited Old Texts as well.
In abandoning the Old Texts and their attendant commentaries,
these scholars necessarily also rejected the orthodox interpretation of
Confucian doctrine. During the later years of the Ch'ing Dynasty (1644
- 1911), some New Text proponents, led by K'ang Yii-wei, argued for
sweeping social and political change to the Chinese order, supported by
their interpretation of the New Text canon.75 The image of Confucius
was recreated, making him an "uncrowned king" whose hortatory pro-
nouncements were seen as pointing the way to a future utopian order.76
Having captured the attention of the young Kuang-hsii emperor,77
the New Text challengers to the political order nearly succeeded in seiz-
ing the opportunity to transform the dynastic system. During the sum-
mer of 1898, Kuang-Hsii issued a comprehensive series of edicts designed
to implement sweeping political and social reforms advocated by K'ang
and his supporters.78 Unhappily for the reformers, the revolutionary po-
tential of the New Text advocates was recognized by conservatives
within the government, including Tz'u-hsi, the powerful Dowager Em-
press. 79 At her order, the edicts were rescinded, the emperor was placed
under what amounted to house arrest, and a number of the New Text
KINSHIP]. For additional assessment of the impact of the k'ao-cheng school on late imperial
Chinese thought, see BENJAMIN A. ELMAN, FROM PHILOSOPHY TO PHILOLOGY: INTELLEC-
TUAL AND SOCIAL ASPECTS OF CHANGE IN LATE IMPERIAL CHINA (1984).
75. K'ang Yii-wei began his scholarly career in typical k'ao cheng form by exposing addi-
tional classical texts to be forgeries. He quickly broadened his critique, advocating the whole-
sale transformation of the Chinese social and political order. K'ang and like-minded reformers
attempted to accomplish major institutional reforms in the dynastic government, but were
ultimately balked by conservatives allied with the Dowager Empress. For a fuller account of
K'ang Yii-wei and the ill-fated chin-wen reform movement, see HsIAo KUNG-CHUAN, A MOD-
ERN CHINA AND A NEW WORLD: K'ANG YU-wEI, REFORMER AND UTOPIAN 1858-1927
(1975); 1 JOSEPH R. LEVENSON, CONFUCIAN CHINA AND ITS MODERN FATE 79-94 (1958);
SCHRECKER, supra note 28, at 117-27.
76. 1 LEVENSON, supra note 75, at 79-85.
77. Kuang-hsii became emperor at the age of three in 1875. His ascendancy to the throne
was engineered by his aunt, Tz'u-hsi, who had been the de facto ruler of China since 1861,
when she became regent for her five-year-old son, the T'ung-chih emperor. When T'ung-chih
suddenly died, Tz'u-hsi arranged the imperial succession so that, as Dowager Empress, she
could continue to be, quite literally, the power behind the throne. SPENCE, supra note I, at
194, 216-17.
78. These edicts encompassed major reforms in the Chinese governmental, educational,
and military establishments. Because they were issued within the brief period between June
and September of 1898, they are often referred to as the Hundred Days' Reforms. Id. at 229.
79. See supra note 77.
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advocates were put to death.80 The political coup was coupled with an
ideological attack on New Text thought by scholars upholding the Old
Text tradition. The Old Text scholars supporting the government did
not base their counter-attack on a substantive critique of the reformers'
proposals, but rather on the argument that the New Text philological
analysis was flawed. 81 Textual exegetical discourse thus served as the
political grammar 82 of late imperial China,83 and it was a form of dis-
course explicitly premised on the essential contestability of the founda-
tional canon.
The Confucian Classics were a generative, foundational text, but
they were not, of course, a constitution. High imperial China had no
such foundational legal document to serve as the charter of the monar-
chy.84 During the last years of the crumbling Ch'ing Dynasty, the impe-
80. SPENCE, supra note 1, at 229-30.
81. For the specifics of the ku-wen scholars' criticism of K'ang Yii-wei's philological
work, which was used as a substitute for criticism of his concrete political program, see 1
LEVENSON, supra note 75, at 88-94.
82. I have appropriated the term "political grammar" from Thomas Metzger, although I
am using it in a slightly different sense from his use in THOMAS A. METZGER, ESCAPE FROM
PREDICAMENT: NEo-CoNFUCIANISM AND CHINA'S EVOLVING POLITICAL CULTURE 14-15
(1977). I chose the term in conscious evocation of the idea, called the Sapir-Whorf hypothesis,
that language acts to constrain world-view and its corollary that experience is conceptualized
according to implicitly accepted, structurally inflexible linguistic rule systems. LYONS, supra
note 29, at 303-12. "Political grammar" is a better metaphor than, say, "political vocabulary,"
because it suggests the dynamically structural nature of the evolution of political discourse, in
which new political meaning is generated in a way analogous to the way in which the trans-
formational rules of grammar are said to generate new utterances. Cf NOAM CHOMSKY, LAN-
GUAGE AND MIND 115-60 (1972) (describing transformational grammatical rules as a model
for linguistic analysis). Just as newly generated utterances, which are potentially infinite in
number, are nevertheless constrained by the syntactic possibilities inherent in grammar, so,
too, the expressions of political discourse within a culture are constrained by its "political
grammar."
83. Benjamin Elman suggests that New Text studies ultimately resulted in the substitu-
tion of political discourse for classical philology. ELMAN, CLASSICISM, POLITICS, AND KIN-
SHIP, supra note 74, at 306-17. I would go further and say that classical philology became a
form of political discourse in light of the significance of the contestability of the canonical
texts.
84. This is not to say that China did not have written law. Beginning in 739 with the
T'ang Dynasty code (T'ang ld" shu z), each dynasty in turn built on the legal efforts of its
predecessors, assembling a massive, complex code of statutes and substatutes. However, these
codes of penal and administrative law did not function as a constitutional charter of govern-
ance. For a more detailed account of the successive Chinese legal codes, see DERK BODDE &
CLARENCE MORRIS, LAW IN IMPERIAL CHINA 52-143 (1967); PAUL HENG-CHAO CH'EN,
CHINESE LEGAL TRADITION UNDER THE MONGOLS: THE CODE OF 1291 AS RECON-
STRUCTED (1979); SYBILLE VAN DER SPRENKEL, LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN MANCHU CHINA:
A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 56-65 (1962); Edward L. Farmer, Social Order in Early Ming
China: Some Norms Codified in the Hung-wu Period, in LAW AND THE STATE IN TRADI-
TIONAL EAST ASIA: SIX STUDIES ON THE SOURCES OF EAST ASIAN LAW 1-36 (Brian E.
McKnight ed., 1987); and Brian E. McKnight, From Statute to Precedent: An Introduction to
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rial government, desperate to stave off its downfall, made a half-hearted
gesture towards implementing a constitutional monarchy patterned on
the Meiji Constitution of Japan.85 However, neither of two draft consti-
tutions issued by the dynastic government were ever put into force.86 In
1911, the forces of revolution overtook the Ch'ing's desultory stab at
constitutionalism. The republican government that replaced the dynastic
monarchy took up the constitutional gauntlet where the Ch'ing had left
off,87 promulgating no fewer than ten constitutions and draft constitu-
tions in rapid succession. 88 Just as competing political factions in late
Sung Law and Its Transformation, in LAW AND THE STATE IN TRADITIONAL EAST ASIA: SIX
STUDIES ON THE SOURCES OF EAST ASIAN LAW, supra, at 111-31.
85. Cohen, China's Changing Constitution, supra note 13, at 794-95.
86. The first of these draft constitutions, the Principles of Constitution (Hsien-fa ta-
kang), was issued by the imperial government on August 27, 1908. For an English translation,
see NORBERT MEIENBERGER, THE EMERGENCE OF CONSTITUTIONAL GOVERNMENT IN
CHINA (1905-1908) 91-93 (1980); another English version can be found in WILLIAM L. TUNG,
THE POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS OF MODERN CHINA 318-19 (1964). The Principals of Consti-
tution was quickly superseded by the Nineteen Articles (Shih-chiu hsin-t'iao), issued on No-
vember 2, 1911. The Nineteen Articles are translated in TUNG, supra, at 320-21. For a brief
historical account of the ultimate failure of Ch'ing constitutionalism, see Peng-yiian Chang,
The Constitutionalists, in CHINA IN REVOLUTION: THE FIRST PHASE, 1900-1913, at 143-83
(Mary C. Wright ed., 1968).
87. For a historical account focusing specifically on constitutionalism in China, from the
waning years of the Ch'ing Dynasty to the draft constitution of 1937, see WEN-YEN TS'AO,
THE CONSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE OF MODERN CHINA 1-22 (1947); see also ANDREW J.
NATHAN, PEKING POLITICS, 1918-1923: FACTIONALISM AND THE FAILURE OF CONSTITU-
TIONALISM (1976) (analyzing the failure of early republican constitutionalism); Herbert H. P.
Ma, American Influence on the Formation of the Constitution and Constitutional Law of the
Republic of China: Past History and Future Prospects, in CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ASIA:
ASIAN VIEWS OF THE AMERICAN INFLUENCE 39 (Lawrence W. Beer ed., 1979). Although
Ma claims that American and other Western constitutionalism was influential in the develop-
ment of republican constitutions, he cites no examples to support this assertion. He does point
out the concrete ways in which Sun Yat-sen's political philosophy shaped the republican con-
stitutions. Id. at 44-50, 55.
88. To some extent, the profusion of republican constitutions was a function of the com-
peting political factions that fractured China in the early years of the Chinese republic. The
initial republican constitution, the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China (Chung-
hua min-kuo lin-shih yfieh-fa), was hastily issued shortly after the Ch'ing emperor was de-
posed, on March 11, 1912. It can be found in translation in TUNG, supra note 86, at 322-25.
On October 13, 1913, this constitution was replaced by the Draft Constitution of the Republic
of China (Chung-hua min-kuo hsien-fa ts'ao-an), also known as the Temple of Heaven Draft
Constitution. On May 1, 1914, the Yiian Shih-k'ai government published the Provisional Con-
stitution of the Republic of China (Chung-hua min-kuo yzieh-fa), which was followed on Au-
gust 12, 1919 by the Draft Constitution of the Republic of China (Chung-hua min-kuo hsien-fa
ts'ao an), also called the Anfu Draft Constitution. The Ts'ao K'un government optimistically
issued what it hoped would be a permanent constitution on October 10, 1923, calling it the
Constitution of the Republic of China (Chung-hua min-kuo hsien-fa). An English text of this
document is found in CH'IEN TUAN-SHENG, THE GOVERNMENT AND POLITICS OF CHINA
436 (1961). Another Draft Constitution of the Republic of China (Chung-hua min-kuo hsien-
fa ts'ao an) was promulgated by Tuan Ch'i-jui on December 12, 1925, and a Draft Provisional
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imperial China used the contestability of canonical texts as the forum
upon which they waged their struggle for the political future of China,
so, too, republican factions contended for political control at least in part
through an attempt to control the content of the foundational text of the
new order-the republican constitution.
In light of the contestability of foundational texts in both the impe-
rial and early republican political orders, it can come as no surprise that
the government of the People's Republic of China likewise has used its
foundational political texts as a vehicle for expression of a changing so-
cial and political order. Immediately upon declaring the creation of the
government of the People's Republic of China, the fledgling state
promulgated a temporary constitution.8 9 This temporary constitution
was superseded in 1954 by the Constitution of the People's Republic of
China, 90 a document patterned after the 1936 Constitution of the Soviet
Union.91
The 1954 Constitution was expressly conceived of as an imperma-
nent document, designed to mark the current stage of China's evolution
from a people's democratic dictatorship toward full socialism.92 When
Constitution of the Republic of China (Chung-hua min-kuo yfieh-fa ts'ao-an), also referred to
as the Taiyiian Draft, was issued by Yen Hsi-shan and Wang Ching-wei on October 27, 1930.
The Nationalist Party (Kuo-min-tang), which eventually held power under Chiang K'ai-shek,
was responsible for three additional constitutions. The first of these, the Provisional Constitu-
tion for the Republic of China during the Period of Tutelage (Chung-hua min-kuo hstin-cheng
shih-ch'i yzieh-fa), was published on June 30, 1931, and can be found in English in TUNG,
supra note 86, at 344-49. It was followed by yet another Draft Constitution of the Republic of
China (Chung-hua min-kuo hsien-fa ts'ao-an), or the May Fifth Draft, issued on May 5, 1936.
This document is translated in TS'Ao, supra note 87, at 239-50. The final Nationalist constitu-
tion, the Constitution of the Republic of China (Chung-hua min-kuo hsien-fa), was promul-
gated during the Civil War between the Nationalists and the Communists on December 25,
1946. English versions can be found in CH'IEN TUAN-SHENG, supra, at app. D, and in TS'AO,
supra note 87, at 275-92.
89. The Common Program of the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference,
issued in 1949, can be found in English translations in THE CHINESE COMMUNIST REGIME:
DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY 34-45 (Theodore Hsi-en Chen ed., 1967), and in FUNDA-
MENTAL LEGAL DOCUMENTS OF COMMUNIST CHINA 34-53 (Albert P. Blaustein ed., 1962).
An earlier constitution enacted in 1931 by the Communists to govern the abortive Chiangsi
Soviet can be found in English in CONRAD BRANDT ET AL., A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF
CHINESE COMMUNISM 220-24 (1966).
90. English language texts of the 1954 Constitution of the People's Republic of China
(Chung-hua jen-min kung-ho kuo hsien-fa) can be found in THE CHINESE COMMUNIST RE-
GIME: DOCUMENTS AND COMMENTARY, supra note 89, at 75-92, and FUNDAMENTAL LEGAL
DOCUMENTS OF COMMUNIST CHINA, supra note 89, at 3. The Chinese government's Foreign
Language Press issued its own English language version in DOCUMENTS OF THE FIRST NA-
TIONAL PEOPLE'S CONGRESS OF THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 131-63 (1955).
91. Barrett, supra note 9, at 308.
92. The Preamble to the 1954 Constitution asserted that it "reflects the basic needs of the
state in the period of transition, as well as the general desire of the people as a whole to build a
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China progressed further along the road to that socialist utopia promised
by teleological Marxist doctrine, then a new constitution would be neces-
sary. That time came in 1975, during the Cultural Revolution, 93 when
the second constitution of the People's Republic was enacted. The 1975
Constitution represented a dramatic deviation from the earlier Soviet-
influenced constitution, and embodied the Maoist ideological vision of
the Cultural Revolution.94
The 1975 Constitution was a hastily conceived document, only a
fraction of the length of the original 1954 Constitution." It failed to
provide a coherent institutional framework for the government and legal
system required by a more politically stable China, and only three years
later a new constitution was perceived as necessary. The balance of
power had shifted in the years immediately after the issuance of the 1975
Constitution.96 The deaths of Chou En-lai97 and Mao Tse-tung, the re-
socialist society." In describing the state apparatus for regulating the economy, the Constitu-
tion explicitly acknowledged the temporary nature of its provisions. See, eg., HSIEN-FA (1954)
art. 5 (P.R.C.) ("[alt present, the following basic forms of ownership of means of production
exist.. .") (emphasis added); id. art. 7 ("Partial collective ownership... is a transitional form
by means ofwhieh... individual working people organize themselves in their advance towards
collective ownership by the working masses") (emphasis added).
93. The Cultural Revolution (1966 - 1976) represented a period of ultra-leftist upheaval
approaching civil war. The magnitude of the convulsion, and the continuing impact of the
experience of the Cultural Revolution on the Chinese people today, cannot be overstated. For
further information on the Cultural Revolution and its aftermath, see TANG Tsou, THE CUL-
TURAL REvoLUTION AND POST-MAo REFORMS: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (1986).
94. The 1975 Constitution was harshly criticized by the Soviet Union for deviating so
markedly from the Soviet model, to which all previous socialist governments had strictly ad-
hered in their constitutions. A summary of the Soviet critique can be found in Hazard, supra
note 24, at 985.
95. The 1954 Constitution consisted of 106 articles of some 15,000 words, while the 1975
Constitution had only 30 articles and 2000 words. For the significance of this textual change,
see supra note 14.
96. As late as 1976, Chinese politics were still dominated by the aging generation of
leaders who had come to prominence during the 1949 revolution, including Mao Tse-tung,
Chou En-lai, and Teng Hsiao-p'ing. For a history of the shifting alliances between the geriat-
ric "old guard" and their supporters and prot6g6s during the waning days of the Cultural
Revolution, see SPENCE, supra note 1, at 645-82.
97. Chou En-lai became a Chinese revolutionary activist just after World War I. Along
with a number of other Chinese radical students, he studied in France and returned to China
to organize cadets at the Whampoa Military Academy. Id. at 321-22, 338. Chou rose to
prominence during the long revolutionary campaign, as both a military and a political leader.
Id. at 403-04, 423-24. Upon the Chinese communist victory in the civil war, Chou assumed a
crucial role in the government as one of five men making up the Standing Committee of the
Politburo. Id. He also served as the premier of the State Council and as foreign minister. Id.
at 520-22. Until his death in 1976, Chou remained one of China's most powerful and revered
leaders. Even in death, Chou affected the course of Chinese political affairs. The spontaneous
public demonstrations and tributes marking Chou's death in large measure contributed to the
downfall of the extremist proponents of the Cultural Revolution. Id. at 645-48.
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ascendance of Teng Hsiao-p'ing,9 and the arrest of the radical Maoist
"Gang of Four" (ssu jen pang)99 signaled a decisive change in the Chi-
nese power structure. The new leadership needed a constitution which
more accurately reflected the more pragmatic political perspective of the
government as it was then constituted. The result was the 1978
Constitution. oo
Within the next few years, Teng Hsiao-p'ing further consolidated
his power, and the government accelerated the pace of policies designed
to promote economic modernization.101 A more detailed constitution,
spelling out the institutional and legal structure of the new China, was
seen as crucial in facilitating the political stability and economic reforms
necessary to modernize the nation.10 2 The product of that perceived
need, the 1982 Constitution, is still in effect.
In tracing the evolution of the Chinese socialist constitutions, one
can find structural traits reflecting the archetypal sacred text interpretive
practices of Confucianism. Just as the Confucian canon was singularly
resistant to closure, so, too, modem Chinese constitutions have been
open to contest and change. The frequency with which Chinese constitu-
tions have been replaced has been viewed by most Western observers in a
98. Like Chou En-lai, Teng Hsiao-p'ing's revolutionary pedigree included socialist educa-
tion in France. Id at 321-22. He participated militarily in the revolutionary struggle in a
remote rural base of operations and was a veteran of the Long March retreat of the Chinese
communist forces into the interior of China. Id at 377, 792. After the communist victory,
Teng was appointed to prominent political posts within the southwest region of China. Id at
523-24. Twice purged for "rightist" tendencies, Teng managed to return to even more power-
ful positions in the Central Committee upon his "rehabilitations." Id at 606, 634, 640, 653,
792. After the death of Chou En-lai in early 1976 and the attendant public demonstrations,
Teng for a third time attained political power. Id. at 653-59.
99. The so-called "Gang of Four" consisted of Chiang Ch'ing (wife of Mao Tse-tung),
Wang Hung-wen (Vice-Chairman of the Central Committee of the Chinese Communist Party),
Chang Ch'iin-ch'iao (head of Shanghai's Communist Party), and Yao Wen-yiian (Shanghai
propagandist who wrote the influential editorial kicking off the Cultural Revolution). All were
members of the Chinese Communist Party Central Committee during the Cultural Revolution
period. Upon their purge in 1976, the "Gang of Four" came to personify leftist extremism in
Chinese political discourse. See, eg., CHI HsIN, THE CASE OF THE GANG OF FOUR 1-74 (2d
ed. 1978) (providing an analysis of the Cultural Revolution in terms of the rise and fall of the
Gang of Four, written by a pseudonymous Chinese writer).
100. Cohen, China's Changing Constitution, supra note 13, at 794.
101. For analysis of the post-Cultural Revolution campaign for economic modernization,
see CHINA'S FOUR MODERNIZATIONS: THE NEW TECHNOLOGICAL REVOLUTION (Richard
Baum ed., 1980); POLICY CONFLICTS IN POST-MAO CHINA (John P. Burns & Stanley Rosen
eds., 1986); and ORVILLE SCHELL, Discos AND DEMOCRACY: CHINA IN THE THROES OF
REFORM (1988).
102. For an official Chinese assessment of the need for the 1982 Constitution, see Hu
Sheng, On the Revision of the Constitution, BEIJING REv., May 3, 1982, at 15.
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negative light10 3 because the Western sacred text archetype for interpret-
ing foundational texts regards such texts as the embodiment of truths,
which, if not absolutely immutable and eternal, ought to be exceedingly
resistant to change. When seen in light of the Chinese textual exegetical
tradition, however, the Chinese openness to constitutional change is en-
tirely consistent with the interpretive assumptions inherent in the Con-
fucian canonical tradition.' °4 As we have seen, the political grammar of
China has consistently utilized the contestability of its foundational texts
as a primary mode of political discourse.
In a second parallel between the Confucian canon and modern Chi-
nese constitutions, both structure their discourse as prescriptive of uto-
pian goals rather than as descriptive of contractual obligations
enforceable against the state.105 In contrast to the covenantal nature of
much of the Judeo-Christian scriptural tradition, the Confucian canon
contained no covenants. 10 6 Rather, the Confucian texts comprised a set
of ethical prescriptions about the way a superior person ought to live and
how a perfect social order ought to be structured.10 7 Particularly as in-
terpreted by the late nineteenth century New Text reform movement, the
Confucian canon constituted a discourse of utopian possibility.108 Simi-
larly, all four Chinese constitutions have contained numerous articles in-
tended as hortative prescriptions for the new China rather than as legally
executable provisions. 10 9 For example, several provisions of the 1982
103. See, ag., Brunner, supra note 24; Cohen, China's Changing Constitution, supra note
13.
104. Professor Gardner characterizes the Neo-Confucian attitude towards their canonical
texts as "desacralized," observing that they considered the canon "less an object of worship,
and more a repository of evidence to be used in 'winning' debates." Gardner, supra note 57, at
596.
105. Compare supra notes 75-83 and accompanying text with infra notes 110-23 and ac-
companying text.
106. The influence of Puritanism's covenant theology on the subsequent development of
American constitutional interpretation has been well documented. See Donald S. Lutz, Reli-
gious Dimensions in the Development ofAmerican Constitutionalism, 39 EMORY L.J. 21, 35-36,
40 (1990); John Witte, Jr., How to Govern a City on a Hilk The Early Puritan Contribution to
American Constitutionalism, 39 EMoRY L.J. 41, 44-54 (1990).
107. See FREDERICK W. MOTE, INTELLECTUAL FOUNDATIONS OF CHINA 29-65 (1971).
108. See supra notes 75-76 and accompanying text.
109. Compare the similarly hortatory nature of the Declaration of Independence, and its
ringing rhetoric of equality and justice, with the precise, business-like quasi-contractual provi-
sions of the American Constitution. James Boyd White has performed an extended rhetorical
comparison of these two texts in JAMEs B. WHITE, WHEN WORDS LOSE THEIR MEANING:
CONSTITUTIONS AND RECONSTITUTIONS OF LANGUAGE, CHARACTER, AND COMMUNITY
231-47 (1984). He characterizes the Declaration of Independence as an "inspirational text" of
"impossible and harmless ideal[s]," in contrast to the Constitution, which he calls a "charter
for collective life." Id at 234, 239-40. The contrast would apply equally to a comparison of
the Chinese and United States Constitutions.
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Constitution proclaim that the state will promote various aspects of an
idealized social order, such as a more advanced economy, 110 an improved
educational system,111 increased scientific development and technological
innovation, 1 2 promotion of an "advanced culture" of high ideals and
ethics,1 13 and equality between the sexes in all aspects of political, eco-
nomic, cultural, social, and family life. 114 Other provisions appear to
grant citizens entitlements to benefits which the Chinese economy is ob-
viously inadequate to provide, such as vacations,1 15 retirement bene-
fits, 116 and social security insurance for the sick, the handicapped, the
disabled, and the dependents of military casualties. 117 Still other provi-
sions prohibit, in vague and sweeping terms, a vast spectrum of antisocial
behavior, as various as sowing discord among ethnic minorities,1 18 dam-
110. HsIEN-FA (1982) art. 14 (P.R.C.) provides, in part:
The state continuously raises labour productivity, improves economic results
and develops the productive forces by enhancing the enthusiasm of the working peo-
ple ....
The state practices strict economy and combats waste.
The state properly apportions accumulation and consumption, concerns itself
with the interests of the collective and the individual as well as of the state and, on
the basis of expanded production, gradually improves the material and cultural life of
the people.
111. Article 19 provides, in part: "The state undertakes the development of socialist edu-
cation and works to raise the scientific and cultural level of the whole nation." Id. art. 19.
112. Article 20 provides: "The state promotes the development of the natural and social
sciences, disseminates knowledge of science and technology, and commends and rewards
achievements in scientific research as well as technological innovations and inventions." Id.
art. 20.
113. Article 24 provides:
The state strengthens the building of a socialist society with an advanced culture
and ideology by promoting education in high ideals, ethics, general knowledge, disci-
pline and legality, and by promoting the formulation and observance of rules of con-
duct and common pledges by various sections of the people in urban and rural areas.
The state advocates the civic virtues of love of the motherland, of the people, of
labour, of science and of socialism. It conducts education among the people in patri-
otism and collectivism, in internationalism and communism and in dialectical and
historical materialism, to combat capitalist, feudal and other decadent ideas.
Id. art. 24.
114. Article 48 provides, in part: "Women in the People's Republic of China enjoy equal
rights with men in all spheres of life, in political, economic, cultural, social and family life."
Id. art. 48.
115. Article 43 states that citizens are entitled to rest and vacation from work. Id. art. 43.
116. Article 44 states that the state will provide retirement pensions. Ia art. 44.
117. Article 45 provides for social insurance for the old, the sick, the disabled, and the
handicapped. It also provides for pensions for military casualties and their families. Id art.
45.
118. Article 4 provides, in part: "Discrimination against and oppression of any nationality
are prohibited; any act which undermines the unity of the nationalities or instigates division is
prohibited." Id. art. 4.
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aging or misappropriating natural resources,1 19 disturbing the socioeco-
nomic order,120 insulting, libeling, or falsely accusing others,
121
mistreating the elderly, women, or children,1 22 and committing acts det-
rimental to the security, honor, or interests of the nation. 123 While West-
ern commentators have cynically seen the inherent unenforceability of
these provisions as proof that the Chinese do not take their constitutions
seriously, such provisions are better understood as consistent with the
interpretive practices deeply embedded in Chinese political tradition.
The political grammar of late imperial China was hortative and utopian
in character; those interpretive practices continue to be expressed in Chi-
nese foundational textual discourse today.
In pointing out the corresponding interpretive structures of the Con-
fucian and Communist foundational texts, I do not mean to imply that
the People's Republic of China is nothing more than the latest in a long
series of Confucian dynasties. Despite the parallels in interpretive strate-
gies and in substantive values124 between Confucian and socialist China,
to exaggerate the continuity between these social orders would be to un-
119. Article 9 provides, in part: "Appropriation or damaging of natural resources... by
whatever means is prohibited." Id. art. 9.
120. Article 15 provides, in part: "Disturbance of the socioeconomic order or disruption
of the state economic plan by any organization or individual is prohibited." Id. art. 15.
121. Article 38 provides: "The personal dignity of citizens of the People's Republic of
China is inviolable. Insult, libel, false accusation or false incrimination directed against citi-
zens by any means is prohibited." Id. art. 38.
122. Article 49 prohibits "maltreatment of old people, women and children ... ." Id. art.
49.
123. Article 54 prohibits commission of "acts detrimental to the security, honour and in-
terests of the motherland." Ia art. 54.
124. Andrew Nathan has traced the continuity of a wide range of political and ethical
values through the imperial, republican, and socialist constitutions, persuasively arguing that
an indigenous Chinese value system has been maintained despite the radical differences in the
three political regimes. See Nathan, Political Rights, supra note 32, at 121-24; Andrew J. Na-
than, Sources of Chinese Rights Thinking, in HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONTEMPORARY CHINA,
supra note 32, at 125-64 [hereinafter Nathan, Sources of Chinese Rights Thinking]; see also
Jonathan K. Ocko, Preface to Symposium, The Emerging Framework of Chinese Civil Law, 52
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS, Spring & Summer 1989, at 1, 11-13 (distinguishing distinctly Chi-
nese from borrowed foreign aspects of contemporary civil law developments in China).
Many historians of China have noted the persistence of Confucian values and patterns of
thought in socialist China. See, ag., ETIENNE BALAZS, CHINESE CIVILIZATION AND Bu-
REAUCRACY 159-60 (Arthur F. Wright ed. & Hope M. Wright trans., 1964); JOHN K. FAIR-
BANK, THE GREAT CHINESE REVOLUTION: 1800-1985, at 361-68 (1986); JOHN K.
FAIRBAN, THE UNITED STATES AND CHINA 49-51 (3d ed. 1971); METZGER, supra note 82,
at 231-35; FREDERIC E. WAKEMAN, JR., HISTORY AND WILL: PHILOSOPHICAL PERSPEC-
TIVES OF MAO TSE-TUNG'S THOUGHT 97-152, 238-73 (1973). These scholars emphasize con-
tinuity within Chinese historical development, maintaining that contemporary Chinese
socialism should not be considered as an externally grafted foreign transplant onto the Chinese
body politic. For a recent study examining the Chinese Revolution as an organic development
within the internal dynamics of Chinese historical processes, see SCHRECKER, supra note 28.
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dervalue the significance of Marxist ideology and practice in transform-
ing contemporary China. Nor do I mean to suggest that modem Chinese
constitutional development cannot profitably be compared with that in
other Marxist nations. 125 When examined as just another case study of
socialist legality, however, modem Chinese legal development appears
strangely anomalous compared with that in other socialist states. Such a
perspective misses the mark by inevitably marginalizing continuities with
traditional Chinese legal practices and values in its focus on Marxist ele-
ments in Chinese legal development. By suppressing the significance of,
on the one hand, China's Chineseness or, on the other hand, its Marxism,
both of these perspectives seriously distort our understanding of Chinese
constitutional discursive practice.
Instead, taking the Chinese historical and social context as my
frame of reference, I assert that Confucianism created a form of political
discourse with its own characteristic set of interpretive assumptions and
strategies, which are deeply embedded in Chinese culture. The continu-
ing legacy of the Confucian political grammar has shaped the patterns of
discourse in modem Chinese constitutional development. Therefore, as
Western scholars look to China for evidence of implementation of its
1982 Constitution, we ought not look for Western style constitutional
interpretation, which is premised upon a Western tradition of interpret-
ing foundational texts. To do so would be to commit the fallacy of false
universalism,1 26 of assuming that the frameworks within which we struc-
ture inquiry into constitutional interpretation are as applicable to the
study of constitutional discourse in China as to the study of American
constitutional law.
On a more general level, those of us engaged in the comparative
study of law must face the question of how to avoid imposing an ethno-
centric framework that fundamentally misrepresents the foreign legal
system. This problem is particularly acute when the legal system being
studied is that of a non-Western society.1 27 The questions we ask, the
issues we think are worthy of study, the answers we propose, however
tentatively, are all determined as much by our own cultural biases and
125. See, e.g., Brunner, supra note 24, at 121; Hazard, supra note 24, at 985.
126. This fallacy is similar to what David Hackett Fischer termed the fallacy of the uni-
versal man, or the implicit assumption that all human beings, regardless of their social or
historical context, share the same psychological makeup. DAVID H. FISCHER, HISTORIANS'
FALLACIES: TOWARD A LOGIC OF HISTORICAL. THOUGHT 203-07 (1970). Instead, Fischer
argues, "[p]eople, in various places and times, have not merely thought different things. They
have thought them differently." Id at 203. See also Clifford Geertz, AntiAnti-Relativism, 86
AM. ANTHROPOLOGIST 263 (1984) (criticizing attempts to posit a culturally invariant human
nature).
127. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
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political preoccupations as by the abstract realities of the system we are
examining. 12  Of course, no scholarship can be totally free of the distor-
tion caused by the historical and cultural situatedness of the scholar. At
best, we can only hope to minimize misrepresentation and misinterpreta-
tion, not to eliminate them.129 But it is possible to become conscious of
the cultural contingency of categorization, 130 and to constantly question
128. This problem is not peculiar to legal scholarship, but is also common in other fields of
scholarship concerned with foreign societies. See, eg., EDWARD W. SAID, ORIENTALISM
(1978) (arguing that nineteenth-century European scholars and statesmen systematically cre-
ated the concept of "the Orient" and imposed this construct for their own political ends).
Historian Paul Cohen has demonstrated the degree to which American scholarship on Chinese
history has been informed, perhaps even deformed, by American experiences such as the Cold
War and the Vietnam War. COHEN, DISCOVERING HISTORY, supra note 28, at 58-63, 98-111.
According to Cohen, American political preoccupations successively generated a set of con-
ceptual frameworks, or paradigms, which constrained historical study of China in the United
States. Id. at 9-55 (the Western impact--Chinese response paradigm); id. at 57-96 (the tradi-
tion-modernization paradigm); id. at 97-147 (the imperialism paradigm).
The constraints placed on historical inquiry described by Cohen operate analogously to
the scientific paradigms of Thomas Kuhn. Kuhn argued that scientific inquiry normally pro-
ceeds on the basis of paradigms, or meta-theories about the nature of reality, which then gener-
ate specific scientific theories commensurate with the paradigms. Intellectual paradigms, be
they scientific or historical, organize and constrain scholarly research, making some questions
seem natural, leading to potentially fruitful avenues of research, and others irrelevant, dead-
end, perverse or even literally unthinkable. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCI-
ENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS 10-51 (2d ed. 1970).
129. In one of his early essays, Jacques Derrida critiqued the work of structuralist anthrb-
pologist Claude Levi-Strauss, suggesting that Levi-Strauss overestimated the possibility of an
anthropological discourse untainted by Western assumptions and values:
[E]thnology ... is primarily a European science employing traditional concepts,
however much it may struggle against them. Consequently, whether he wants to or
not-and this does not depend on a decision on his part-the ethnologist accepts into
his discourse the premises of ethnocentrism at the very moment when he denounces
them.... But if no one can escape this necessity, and if no one is therefore responsi-
ble for giving in to it, however little he may do so, this does not mean that all the
ways of giving in to it are of equal pertinence. The quality and fecundity of a dis-
course are perhaps measured by the critical rigor with which this relation to the
history of metaphysics and to inherited concepts is thought. Here it is a question
both of a critical relation to the language of the social sciences and a critical responsi-
bility of the discourse itself. It is a question of explicitly and systematically posing
the problem of the status of a discourse which borrows from a heritage the resources
necessary for the deconstruction of that heritage itself. A problem of economy and
strategy.
Jacques Derrida, Structure, Sign and Play in the Discourse of the Human Sciences, in WRITING
AND DIFFERENCE 278, 282 (Alan Bass trans., 1967) (emphasis in original). As Derrida recog-
nized, the mere fact that all discourse is, to some degree, inherently a product of the culture in
which it is situated, does not mean that all discourse is equally ethnocentric. Thus, conscious
striving to minimize ethnocentric aspects of scholarly discourse is both possible and desirable.
See also infra notes 130-31.
130. This point is suggested by the position taken by Steven Winter in his disagreement
with Stanley Fish on the consequences of theory for practice. See supra note 54 for the sources
of this debate. Winter contends, correctly I think, that self-conscious awareness of one's own
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and test those categories against the cultural context we are studying.131
The bottom line question for the scholar of the Chinese legal system must
always be whether her analysis rings true given a Chinese historical and
cultural context for the inquiry. 132
John K. Fairbank, the doyen of American historians of China, once
cautioned Western observers of China against complaining, like Profes-
sor Henry Higgins in "My Fair Lady": "Why can't they be more like
us?"' 133 If we look for signs that the Chinese are adopting a Western
liberal constitutionalism, then we are likely to be disappointed. Chinese
constitutional interpretation must evolve in Chinese terms, drawn from
interpretive strategies and assumptions with roots in Chinese patterns of
discourse. It is to that Chinese political grammar that we must look if
we are to understand Chinese constitutional practice in the future.
interpretive constructs is both possible and necessary. Winter, supra note 54, at 677-93. One
aspect of being aware of one's own interpretive constructs is the recognition that the constructs
could be other than as they are, in short that constructs are radically contingent, depending on,
among other factors, one's social, cultural, and historical context.
131. Paul Cohen suggests a similar stance in his advocacy of what he terms a "China-
centered" history of China. COHEN, DISCOVERING HISTORY, supra note 28, at 149-98. A
different approach to the same end is that proposed by Clifford Geertz, who urges "thick
description," or highly contextualized, multi-layered narrative as an anthropological method-
ology. CLIFFORD GEERTZ, Thick Description: Toward an Interpretive Theory of Culture, in
THE INTERPRETATION OF CULTURES 3 (1973).
132. In advocating that Western scholars analyze Chinese constitutional discourse in the
context of an autochthonous Chinese political culture, I am in no way suggesting that Western
commentators ought to be uncritical as to the moral or political dimensions of the values or
actions of the Chinese government. It is one thing to take internal Chinese dynamic forces
seriously in historical analysis, and another thing entirely to applaud them on a normative
level. Even assuming that a scholar could avoid making value judgements about contemporary
China, which I believe impossible in any event, such a stance seems to me to be an unnecessary
and unwarranted abdication of intellectual responsibility.
133. Maurice Meisner, Marxism and Chinese Values, in THE CHINA DIFFERENCE 101,
101 (Ross Terrill ed., 1979).
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